Monetary policy strategies : a central bank panel by Jean-Claude Trichet
Dear ladies and gentlemen, I had the privilege of participating with
Alan in all meetings of the G7 ministers and governors over the last 18
years. But there is one big difference between us. He participated in all
these meetings as president of the Federal Reserve, whereas my respon-
sibilities changed three times during this period. I was successively
undersecretary of the treasury of my country, governor of Banque de
France, and then president of the European Central Bank (ECB). I,
therefore, could look at the legendary exposition of Alan in the G7 from
three different angles, now not only with the benefit of a multiocular
perspective, but also of hindsight. And I can say that in 3-D, Alan’s expo-
sitions in this intimate, restricted format are incredibly sharp, profound,
and visionary. I personally share fully, in particular, the judgment of Alan
Blinder and Ricardo Reis on the lucidity of Alan as regards the early
diagnosis of the productivity jump in the U.S. economy. 
Not only in the United States, but also in Europe and the rest of the
world, Alan has a very high reputation. In some European quarters, he
even sometimes is made the principal witness of monetary policy
activism, but I am not sure whether he himself would agree with such
a role. Still, the issue of the Fed’s movements in interest rates and those
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523Since January 1, 1999, when the ECB officially became the mone-
tary authority of the euro area, the ECB has changed its policy rate 15
times. The easing cycle that started in 2001 on both sides of the
Atlantic saw a cumulative reduction in the euro area’s policy rate of
275 basis points, accomplished over seven moves. That cycle has not
been reversed yet. 
The fact that we have moved less frequently than the Federal Reserve,
in particular over the last two years, has generated a very interesting
discussion on central bank activism. The undisputed notion that the
central bank should react to the state of the economy goes a long way
to explaining why different currency areas have witnessed different
degrees of central bank activism. Shocks of greater magnitude and/or
longer duration, and an economic system in which exogenous distur-
bances run their course more strongly and speedily, can largely explain
different policy responses, as measured by the frequency of policy
moves and the cumulative change in the policy rate. 
So, different contingencies and economic structures—quite natu-
rally—can result in a different conduct of policy. And I could explain
at length why in 2001 the highest rates in the euro area were only at
the level of 4.75 percent, when they were at 6.5 percent in the United
States, and why the cumulative reduction in the easing cycle has been
larger in the United States, only taking into account objective meas-
ures of the differences of amplitude of the economic swings that have
characterized both sides of the Atlantic.1 But I would like to share with
you today some thoughts on a different sort of difference in “activism”:
one that is not induced by the state of the economy, but rather, one
that finds deeper motivation in the central bank’s strategy. 
It is the degree of activism that results from the way policymakers try
to reconcile a fundamental tension inherent in their profession. On
the one hand, as a quite general principle of prudent monetary gover-
nance, it pays to adopt a systematic policy focused on responding to
the fundamental forces at work in the economy in a predictable
manner, disregarding the vagaries of expectations and markets’ fads.
This policy would enhance markets’ ability to anticipate the central
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 bank’s behavior, favor a smooth adjustment of the economy to distur-
bances, and prevent instability of expectations from injecting volatility
into monetary policy, and in turn into the economy. If successful, the
degree of activism displayed by this policy would be mainly related to
the variability of the state of the economy. On the other hand, a
central bank also does need to recognize that misled expectations can
amplify and prolong the response of inflation and economic activity to
an inflationary or deflationary shock. In general, this would imply that
the central bank should embark on an aggressive policy action in
response to expectations instability. And, this will add to the degree of
activism displayed by the policy rate. 
I will argue that, while the central bank must always be ready to take
aggressive action if needed, a well-designed institutional framework,
which undisputedly assigns the central bank the primary objective of
price stability, and the adoption of a clear monetary policy strategy,
which quantitatively defines price stability and does not pretend to
fine-tune directly the business cycle, can make the latter type of policy
activism unnecessary in many circumstances. The reason is that this
framework reduces uncertainty about the central bank’s ultimate
motives, provides a stronger anchor for inflation expectations, and
makes it easier for the markets to map the expected path of the policy
rate to the evolution of macroeconomic conditions. This would reduce
the likelihood that expectations might overreact in the first place and,
should expectation instability nevertheless occur, provides the central
bank with an additional viable option. 
I will argue that under some conditions, the central bank can regain
control of private expectations not with necessarily changing interest
rates, but by being visibly and credibly “alert,” explaining and stress-
ing its commitment to maintaining inflation at levels consistent with
the price stability objective. The threat to act will be more effective the
more credible the central bank has been over time in actually deliver-
ing price stability, as defined quantitatively. The paradox would be that
this policy of a priori “reinforced alertness” would make the central
bank appear ex post less “activist” in terms of changes to the policy
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 rate. Importantly, as a side effect, this policy would better sustain
economic activity and minimize macroeconomic volatility.
In practice, the central bank normally would make use of all available
options—as circumstances dictate—to counteract situations that have
the potential for undermining confidence and perturbing market condi-
tions for a lasting period. We have done that in the past, and we will do
it in the future. As an example, under the chairmanship of my predeces-
sor, Wim Duisenberg, whose passing away a month ago has deprived
our community of central bankers of a man of remarkable wisdom and
lucid judgment, we took immediate decisions after the dramatic events
of September 11, pouring very large amounts of liquidity in euro, setting
up a swap agreement with the Fed, and decreasing rates. This has
demonstrated very clearly that the ECB was eager to act decisively and
immediately when appropriate and had absolutely no enshrined bias for
waiting for the “slowest ship in the convoy.” This observation that all
observers and market participants made was certainly important in rein-
forcing the credibility of the Governing Council of the ECB when
embarking on a “reinforced alertness.”
In all situations, we have been aided in our task by our monetary policy
strategy. Clarity about the quantitative definition of price stability and
about the framework we adopt to assess risks to price stability has been
particularly important for us to ensure a smooth start to Monetary Union
in Europe. Such clarity afforded considerable latitude for action in the
early years of the decade, despite repeated unfavorable shocks, and a
remarkable leverage over market conditions.
The advantages of a rule-like behavior  
At first thought, a “discretionary” response to shocks might seem
exactly what one would expect of a professional central banker. After
all, each economic contingency is a unique combination of circum-
stances that, in its own way, is unprecedented, and probably will never
repeat itself again in that precise form. So, each new contingency
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 would seem to command a different, tailor-made response on the part
of monetary authorities. 
There is some grain of truth to this. But decades of reflections on the
role of expectations in macroeconomics have taught us that monetary
policy is not a sequence of isolated policy actions. When forming their
expectations, agents seek to capture the general pattern of monetary
policies, and it is that pattern that matters in shaping their economic
behavior. Therefore, the relevant problem to solve for central banks is
not so much about the size and timing of a given interest rate move in
response to a particular contingency. It is more about the strategy for
repeatedly adjusting the policy instrument in response to the state of the
economy, whatever this might be. 
If the central bank is able to convince economic agents and market
participants of its analysis and assessment of the outlook, and of the
policy measures that it is going to take in response to it, this mecha-
nism of anticipation will act in a self-equilibrating manner. As soon as
the macroeconomic news is released, expectations of the short-term
interest rates will adjust in the equilibrating direction that markets
expect to see implemented by the central bank. Such a credibility asset
can turn out to be very beneficial in cases of major shocks and risks. 
It is clear that a world in which central banks’ inclinations and
market views are perfectly aligned is unlikely to emerge in reality.
However, decades of academic reflection and central banks’ quest for
stability have not past in vain. Our keen preoccupation with making
ourselves understood by words and deeds has established a new
climate of mutual understanding with academics, investors, market
participants, and public opinion at large. We have stepped up the
number of gatherings in which we document our strategies and care-
fully explain our actions to broad audiences. On the markets’ side, our
constant drive toward a continuous and all-round exchange with the
public has been rewarded tangibly with high marks. The leverage of
central bank pronouncements and actions over private economic
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 behavior has strengthened to an extent that we could not have imag-
ined remotely only a decade ago. 
There is no shortcut to fully revealing a central bank’s strategy. This
disclosure—which we perform in an ongoing process of interactions
with a large and complex audience—helps to clarify the policy envi-
ronment and anchors expectations. But unless deeds support words,
words will be unconvincing. So, there is no better way to establish a
reputation for actually following a strategy of monetary policy than
letting the public infer and recognize it from our repeated behavior.
Consistent behavior is a precondition for outsiders to understand our
actions and believe our pronouncements. In synthesis, it is a precon-
dition for our credibility. 
This capital of credibility is built over time and easily squandered. So,
as a general principle, in weighing up the arguments for and against
such and such a decision, we should never fail to appreciate that our
behavior has durable significance. It can add to the asset of credibility,
or detract from it in important ways.
A corollary: Beware of false signals
In my view, the statement that a reputation for consistent behavior
is an asset carries an important corollary with it. We should guard
against overreacting to indicators that might give a distorted picture of
economic reality and thus promote policies that might be regretted—
and hastily reversed—in retrospect. 
To be more specific, in carrying out our strategies, we would ideally
need accurate, quantitative, contemporaneous readings of the current
pertinent economic, monetary, and financial data. For instance, knowl-
edge of the level of production that would be consistent with stable
prices, the so-called natural rate of output, would be an important tool
for assessing whether the stance of policy is broadly appropriate.
However, estimates of the time-varying natural rate of output, and by
implication, measures of economic slack, are notoriously very imprecise.
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 Even in hindsight, different estimation methods yield quite dispersed
figures. Allowing for data revisions, that is, reappraising those synthetic
indicators by aggregating revised data, only makes the uncertainty
surrounding those measures more pervasive. 
Now, acting too strongly on such indicators only to be forced to
reverse gear soon thereafter as new estimates become available, risks
the danger of an erratic policy process. Importantly, it confounds the
markets, which look back on our record and try to make sense of our
past behavior using the wisdom that is only available in hindsight. If
this gives indications that differ markedly from those which could be
reasonably inferred in real time, outside observers might extract a
distorted picture of our intentions. Even prudent policy conduct could
appear ex post—and be deplored—as evidence of incorrect decisions.
This could drain the central bank’s stock of credibility.
All this is not new and revives memories of the 1970s. Were the
spectacular policy mistakes of that unfortunate decade due to poor
economic theory, poor policy, or a biased representation of the
economy? It was probably a blend of all of these factors, with the last
one carrying substantial weight. 
Advances in theory since the 1970s and more sophisticated econo-
metrics have not immunized the policy process from these potential
pitfalls. And here is a concrete example of what I mean. The first esti-
mates of the output gap are typically available during the reference
year and are then revised over subsequent years. It is important to note
that the final estimate is not available for a very long period of time:
1999 estimates, for example, were still revised by non-negligible
amounts in 2004. Revisions are also large: They often can affect the
sign, as well as the magnitude of the estimates. In the case at hand, for
example, the revised output-gap measure available to us today is posi-
tive in almost all estimates for 1999, 2000, and 2001, but it was
estimated to be negative in real time, as shown in Chart 1.2
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 Uncertainty is even higher for output gap projections, which are the
only measures of output gap existing at the beginning of each year. For
example, the real-time estimates of the output gap for 2005, published
in the spring by the European Commission, the IMF, and the OECD,
differ on average more than 25 percent from the output-gap projec-
tions that these institutions made at the end of 2004. And, if we add
to the real-time measures of the output gap for 2005 the average size
of revisions observed in the past, we can conclude that it ex post may
turn out to be anything between -3.6 percent and +0.8 percent. 
Clearly, output-gap measurement issues are not a fact of the past.
Central banks also need to cope with this problem at present. I take
this as a warning that the central bank should not rely on any simple
indicator of economic slack in taking its policy decisions. To conclude
this point, I would say that there are, undoubtedly, great differences in
terms of monetary policy strategy between us at the ECB and, to use
Alan Blinder terms, the Greenspan’s Fed. We consider the public
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Making the simplifying assumption that data revised three years after the initial estimates are approxi-
mately correct, the chart displays revised data for the period up to spring 2002.
 display of our arithmetic definition of price stability essential to the
success of our strategy. We equally deem that the communication to
the markets of our two-pillar monetary policy concept is important
and has been of great help in the actual implementation of our policy.
It is true, in that sense, that we belong to two different schools of
thoughts on each side of the Atlantic.
On the contrary, there is an important point on which we share
exactly the same views. We both want to be as comprehensive as possi-
ble in our analysis. We both do not want to neglect any information,
any in-depth appreciation of a particular situation. We both do not
want to rely exclusively on a single particular model of the economy,
as sophisticated as it may be. I myself have said several times that the
Governing Council of the ECB has no intention of being the prisoner
of a single system of equations. We both highly praise “robustness.”
There is no substitute for a comprehensive analysis of the risks to price
stability that pays due attention to all relevant information. It stands
better chances of anchoring policy and—through that channel—
expectations in a durable fashion. 
Responding to risks of instability 
It is to expectations and the way their dynamics should be factored
into policy that I now turn. 
Why should expectations be a problem within a credible policy envi-
ronment? Because the economy is never at rest. Agents have to catch
up with the continuous change in their environment by an ongoing
process of learning. When shocks are moderate, or the underlying
evolution of the economic structure proceeds at a slow pace, imperfect
information and learning do not excessively complicate our interac-
tions with the private sector. But there are times in which stormy
perturbations and accelerated structural change make uncertainty
more acute. These are times in which a perpetual process of learning
on the part of economic agents can have implications for the overall
stability of the economic system—to some extent, independently of
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 the monetary policy regime that is in place. If agents do not possess
rational expectations, but have to re-estimate continuously the coeffi-
cients of an unknown model of the economy, using rolling windows
of new observations, it well can happen that a shock of sufficiently
serious magnitude can unsettle expectations, even under credible
monetary institutions. The reason for this is simple. It might become
impossible for private forecasters to form quickly a reasoned guess
about the scale of the shock, its duration and persistence, and the like-
lihood that it might not be easily washed away, so that it would
become, in their eyes, embedded in the fundamental relations regulat-
ing the functioning of the economy for some time to come.
Long-term expectations, thus, may overreact to the shock. They may
drift endogenously, reflecting the impact that the unprecedented
disturbance exerts on agents’ own reassessment of the key structural
features of the economy. 
These are times in which, typically, there is a disconnection between
private views about the macroeconomic outlook and the central bank’s
own internal forecasts. The expectation of the most likely outcome
entertained by the median agent in the economy is likely to depart
from the central scenario that is considered most plausible, given the
conditioning assumptions, for purposes of the central bank’s own
internal assessment of the macroeconomic outlook. As agents’ expec-
tations shape the market reaction to new economic data and to the
central bank’s own policy actions, they embed information that the
central bank cannot neglect or grossly underrate in its own analysis. 
The difficulty lies in devising a prudent way to factor such situations
into policy. And here is where the fundamental tension inherent in our
profession comes in. On the one hand, we want to keep our eyes on the
fundamentals and avoid being misled or intoxicated by what well could
be noise and unfounded overreactions. On the other hand, excess
endogenous volatility in private expectations could indeed provide
advance warning of pending risks that the central bank should take into
account. Misled market expectations can prolong the dynamic response
of inflation and real activity to an inflationary or deflationary shock of
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 sufficiently great potency. This might entail serious risks of instability.
Recent work done at the Federal Reserve Board by Athanasios
Orphanides and John Williams 3 shows that, in these circumstances, a
rise (or fall) of private inflation expectations beyond (or short of) those
implied by perfect knowledge should elicit a more aggressive response
than could be expected in normal conditions. The optimality of such a
response is corroborated in a study by Vitor Gaspar, Frank Smets, and
David Vestin4 at the ECB. They argue that when agents perceive infla-
tion persistence to be high, inflationary—or deflationary—shocks can
become easily entrenched because agents suspect that these forces will
be perpetuated by the economic structure.
An aggressive policy adjustment in reaction to detected signs of
expectation instability can help head off the risks that one might see
associated with the manifestation of such phenomenon. It might be an
effective way to prove that the central bank is perceptive to changing
circumstances—even to changing views about circumstances, present
and prospective—and ready to act preemptively. However, any unex-
pected and possibly unprecedented action that the central bank takes
in response to these risks might disorient the market. So, the process
by which market participants price long-dated securities and assets in
general might be impaired, as investors might misinterpret the central
bank’s intentions. As a consequence, asset prices could be driven far
away from fundamental values, and confidence could be undermined. 
This would suggest that action may not always be advisable. Some-
times, more optimal behavior consists in appropriately communicating
the central bank’s assessment of the fundamental state of the economy
and its prospects in order to regain control of inflation expectations. In
the long term, the advantages of having systematically avoided hasty
reactions outweigh the benefits that might be apparent in the short
term. By maintaining a steadier posture, the central bank embracing
this policy views its role as that of a lighthouse or, more accurately, a
lightship, in a storm. In this respect, building a reputation for a calm
and firm management of the events can pay off.
Central Bank Panel 533
 The viability of this approach—and its efficiency—is enhanced
when the central bank operates within a clearly defined institutional
framework. In policymaking regimes that feature a primary, sharply
defined objective—reinforced by a precise numerical definition of the
central bank’s notion of price stability—the likely evolution of the
economy vis-à-vis that objective gives clear indications as to the most
likely future stance of policy. This is supposed to diminish the odds
that expectations might start diverging in the first place. And, if expec-
tation instability should develop nonetheless, being able to refer in
communication unambiguously to that objective can—at times and
under certain circumstances—provide an effective substitute for tangi-
ble action, provided “credible alertness” of the central bank is
undisputed by market participants. 
Action and vigilance 
All in all, the art of central banking involves finding a fine balance
between action and words in order to react to changing market expec-
tations. The easing cycle that started in 2001 and the instability in
inflation expectations that occurred in 2003 represent two episodes
that illustrate how the ECB has devised, in practice, its own way to
address these issues. 
In early 2001, the ECB started an easing cycle. At the time, on the
heels of significant adverse supply shocks and rather strong wage
dynamics, inflation rates were high, at levels unseen since the late
phases of convergence to the new currency in the euro area. However,
we equally saw an upcoming worsening of the outlook for economic
activity, as indicated by the rapid decline in several confidence meas-
ures. This lowered the risks to inflation coming from wages, and
inflationary pressures more generally.
While we assessed that the information coming from monetary
trends was consistent with price stability over the medium term, we
took the view that the upward inflationary pressures were of a tempo-
rary nature and warranted looking through the shocks that had caused
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 them to emerge. We held the view that a protracted period of weak
economic activity, and the increasing odds that the recovery would not
materialize soon, would eventually facilitate a downward adjustment
in price- and wage-setting behaviors. The easing cycle, which we
readily initiated, registered a cumulative decline in the policy rate of
275 basis points over two years, moving the policy rate down to 2
percent, which was below the lowest intervention rates of the central
banks over a century for an overwhelming majority of countries that
are members of the euro area, including Germany. 
Let me stress a point which is often underestimated. What looks
perfectly appropriate with the benefit of hindsight, moving down
interest rates to such low levels—exploring secular uncharted waters—
was indeed bold ex ante for a new institution, which in mid-2003 was
exactly 5 years old—and for a new currency, that at that time was 41⁄2
years old. It had not been done to that extent by either the Fed or the
Bank of England! In retrospect, we have been bold and equally lucid.
There is no doubt that the Governing Council used appropriate judg-
ment in granting high weight to the decrease of inflationary pressures
stemming from the downside risks to economic activity. And there is
also no doubt that the resolute action of the ECB, based on its own
inflationary analysis, not only permitted to stabilize inflation and
inflationary expectations, but also helped to forestall a much deeper
slowdown in the economy. 
The behavior of inflation expectations brings me to the other
episode I have mentioned. Long-term inflation expectations, which
had remained well-anchored at levels in line with the ECB definition
of price stability from the outset of the Monetary Union in January
1999, started displaying signs of upward instability in the second half
of 2003 after the last decision to decrease rates. The 10-year break-
even inflation rate (BEIR) suggested an incipient rise in longer-term
inflation expectations, as seen in Chart 2. Survey-based data also
revealed that the probability assigned to inflation outcomes being
above our definition of price stability at long horizons was rising, as
shown in Chart 3a.
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Chart 2
Developments in Long-Term Inflation Expectations
Chart 3b
Survey of Professional 
Forecasters: Disagreement of
Five Years-Ahead Forecast of
Inflation
Note: Disagreement is measured as the 
standard deviation of individual forecasters’
point estimates.
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Chart 3a
Survey of Professional 
Forecasters: Probability that
Five years-Ahead Inflation 
May Stand at or Above 2%
 Movements in these indicators of long-term inflation expectations
possibly reflected concerns that the policy stance was incompatible
with the inflationary impact of the surge in oil prices, accompanied by
a pick-up in economic activity and protracted conditions of ample
liquidity, which could be seen as favoring spending propensities and
granting firms increasing pricing power.5
The rise in inflation expectations was considered very carefully by the
ECB’s Governing Council. It was of utmost importance to regain
control of these expectations, for all reasons that would be common to
all central banks plus three which were particular to the ECB. First, as
I have explained already, we had been bold in exploring new territory
in the lower side of interest rates, and we had to dissipate any wrong
sentiment in the markets that we could have neglected our main objec-
tive, namely price stability. Second, we also had to eliminate the risk
that part of the market might be tempted to regard the single currency
as embedding the average features of the constituent currencies, rather
than inheriting the characteristics of the best performing monetary
regimes that constituted its legacy. That the euro, since its inception,
has been, was, and will be at least as credible, as stable, and as good a
store of value as the most credible national currencies were, was a
fundamental goal of the Monetary Union, remarkably marshaled with
the greatest success at the time of the transition. And, third, because our
analysis was that market participants, by possibly over-assessing
medium- and long-term inflationary expectations, were pushing up
medium- and long-term market rates at a moment when it was not
advisable necessarily in our own judgment.
Our concern about rising inflation expectations was signaled to the
market from autumn 2003 in the press conference. Over time, our
communication became increasingly “alert,” signaling our vigilance to
the upside risks to inflation which grew at the time. We made it clear
in our June 2004 policy statement, stating that such an upward trend
in inflation expectations called for “particular vigilance,” and in
September, the expression of concern was reinforced with a statement
of “strong vigilance,” making it crystal clear that the ECB was ready to
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 take whatever action necessary to eliminate the drift in expectations
and restore stability. 
Of course, it is difficult to isolate the effect of our renewed emphasis
on our objective and on the determination with which we would
enforce it. But what we could observe from the second quarter of 2004
onward was that measures of inflation expectations stabilized, then
started to edge down, and the probability assigned by survey respon-
dents to inflation outcomes being higher than our price stability
objective declined. We also observed a decline to unprecedented low
levels in the standard deviation of individual respondents’ point fore-
casts, the “disagreement,” revealing increased alignment of private sector
expectations around a focal point—which was coherent with our notion
of price stability (see Chart 3b). As the stabilization of inflation expecta-
tions and their following decline coincide with the display by the ECB
of its constant alertness as a key feature of the central bank’s policy, it
probably can be argued that the market had become increasingly aware
of the ECB’s readiness to act, and, therefore, that the ECB’s communi-
cation was one of the main factors driving expectations. An argument
supporting this view is that the decline in break-even inflation coincides
with a sharp rise in oil prices. This constituted a major break from the
past, when rises in oil prices regularly led to higher break-even inflation
rates. However, other factors also may have contributed to the fall in
expected inflation, such as technical market factors, dampened dynam-
ics in labor costs, and increasing weakness in leading indicators of
economic activity. Of course, while communication can play a decisive
role in steering expectations, it is, in the end, the actual conduct of
monetary policy and its success in maintaining price stability that over
the longer run will determine inflation expectations.
Further insights about this episode can be obtained by looking at
developments in inflation expectations at different horizons, shown in
Chart 4a. The short-term BEIR (derived from instruments with matu-
rity 2008) was not lastingly affected by the ECB’s communication of
2004 and remained at values slightly above the ECB’s definition of















expected, its dynamics were more closely associated to movements in
actual inflation and short-term indicators of inflationary pressure, such
as oil price dynamics. However, the implied forward BEIR (referring to
the period 2008-2014), which one would expect to reflect much more
closely the central bank’s credibility, exhibits a downward trend that
starts in mid-2004. These patterns are even more striking if compared
to the experience of other countries with a long track record, such as
the United States. Over the same period, indicators of short- and long-
term inflation expectations in the United States display a tighter
association (see Chart 4b), and, in turn, they are more closely correlated
with actual inflation and developments in oil prices.6
Over the last two years, stability in long-term inflation expectations
was restored without engineering policy actions. The easing cycle that
started in 2001 has not been reversed yet, and the ECB has kept the
policy rate constant at 2 percent since June 2003. During this period,
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2008 BEIRthe ECB has stressed that its policy assessment is conditional to macro-
economic conditions, and this seems to be well understood by the
markets. Changes in economic conditions and concomitantly in the
ECB’s assessment of these conditions and their implications for the
prospects, and the associated risks, for economic activity and inflation
have allowed market participants to read signals about future changes
in the policy rate. This is evident in movements in money market
forward rates, which are mainly driven by expectations of future policy
rates. Although the ECB has maintained constant its interest rates over
this long period, forward rates have displayed substantial movements,
as shown in Chart 5. A close look at these movements, and especially
their timing, show how difficult it has been to correctly forecast the
turning point during the current economic cycle in the euro area and
the outlook for price stability, as evidence of a brightening in the
prospects for a gradual economic recovery was shortly afterward
contradicted by the appearance of downside risks to economic growth,
and as oil prices showed significant volatility. This pattern of events has
repeated itself more than once over this period, and uncertainty has
still to dissipate fully.
The Governing Council, on the basis of its comprehensive economic
and monetary analyses, constantly has monitored and assessed macro-
economic conditions and the outlook for price stability. In its judgment,
overall it has required keeping the policy rate at 2 percent in each
meeting over this period. In the monthly press conference following the
Governing Council meeting in which we discuss monetary policy, I very
regularly have made the point that we were not making any promises to
the markets about future policy moves and that we stood ready to act as
soon as is necessary to maintain price stability.
Conclusion 
If I had to draw some lessons for the future both from what has been
observed on this side of the Atlantic during Alan’s tenure, and what has
been our experience in Europe, I would like to suggest three words:
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First, we have to stand ready at any time to weather the materializa-
tion of new risks. The last 18 years have been particularly impressive
from that standpoint. Those risks are probably the unavoidable and
necessary counterpart of the immense chances that science and tech-
nology on the one hand, and the success of emerging economies and
globalization on the other, are bringing about in the world economy.
Being intellectually and conceptually ready is extremely important.
Incidentally, that is the reason why financial stability should continue
to be of the essence and be a constant inspiration for monetary policy.
Second, we have to fully accept that our economies, as well as the
global economy, are experiencing a period of very rapid structural
changes. I would fully subscribe to Alan’s remark that “the economic
world…is best described by a structure whose parameters are continu-
ously changing.” It is even truer in Europe. Because in addition to the
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Chart 5
Money Market Rates, Implied Forward Rates, 
and Minimum Bid Rate
Note: The minimum bid rate in the ECB’s Main Refinancing Operations is one of the ECB’s key policy
rates. Last observation is August 23, 2005.
 impact of science and technology, in addition to the effect of global-
ization, in addition to the very rapid demographic changes that
characterize the industrial world, we also have to take into account the
structural transformations that Europe has boldly marshaled for itself:
the single market, the single currency, the historic enlargement. But
the lesson is valid for all. Robustness in the present situation is key,
and we should not depend on a single model which necessarily would
impoverish considerably the wealth of information needed for an
enlightened decision. 
Third, I would stress more than ever for the future the concept of
credibility. It is because the Fed, throughout the last 18 years, has been
very highly credible that remarkable successes have been achieved on
price stability, even without what I would consider as a precondition
for anchoring inflationary expectations: a quantitative definition of
price stability. In all difficult episodes and crises, the credibility of the
Fed has been decisive in the effectiveness of its handling of the situa-
tion. In the case of the Governing Council of the ECB, I have
explained that our credibility has enabled us to regain full control of
inflationary expectations with remarkable efficiency over the last two
years. And this was because observers and market participants rightly
had the intimate conviction that we intended to be absolutely ready to
act at any time if needed and were not inhibited in any respect either
by unconditional commitments—that we always have avoided care-
fully—or by any kind of well-intentioned public pressures coming
from many circles, including the political sphere, of which we were not
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Table 2
Survey-Based Measures of Long-Term Inflation Expectations for
the Euro Area and the United States (1999-2005)
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Sources: European Commission, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal
Reserve Board
Note: (1) HICP for the euro area, CPI for the United States; (2) total economy for euro area and busi-
ness sector for the United States.
Euro Area United States
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total real GDP growth 1.8 0.9 0.7 1.7 0.2 1.9 4.0 3.8
of which:
Private consumption 1.9 0.9 1.1 1.2 2.8 1.9 3.8 3.8
Government consumption 2.1 2.6 1.3 2.6 5.0 4.0 2.0 2.1
Gross fixed capital formation 0.0 -2.3 0.4 1.3 -13.8 4.9 7.7 10.4
Inflation (1) 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.6 2.4 1.9 3.3
Inflation excl. energy and 
unprocessed food (1) 1.9 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.7 1.9 1.1 2.2
Unemployment rate
(percentages) 7.9 8.3 8.7 8.9 4.8 5.8 6.0 5.5
Unit labor costs 2.2 2.3 1.8 0.9 0.3 -0.7 -0.1 3.0
Compensation per employee (2) 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.1 3.7 2.8 3.0 2.4
Labor productivity (2) 0.4 0.2 0.4 1.2 3.2 3.5 5.5 2.8
Capactiy utilization (percentages) 83.2 81.2 81.1 81.6 74.4 75.2 76.8 79.2
Sources: Consensus Economics Inc., ECB calculations, Reuters
Note: (a) Long-term inflation expectations from Consensus Economics refer to six-10 years ahead. The
last observation is April 2005. For the euro area, data before 2003 are taken from ECB Working Paper
No. 273. (b) Long-term inflation expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters refer to five
years ahead for the euro area and 10 years ahead for the United States. Last observation is July 2005 for
the euro area and August 2005 for the United States.
Euro Area  United States
Mean Std Mean  Std
Consensus Economics (a) 1.85 0.09 2.49 0.12
Survey of Professional Forecasters (b) 1.88 0.04 2.49 0.04544 Jean-Claude Trichet
Chart 1a
Long-Term Implied Forward BEIR in the Euro Area and the
United States
Source: Reuters and ECB calculations
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1Table 1 in the Appendix displays the evolution of several macroeconomic indi-
cators both for the euro area and the United States over the last few years.
2Chart 1 displays estimates of the output gap constructed by the European Commis-
sion, the Interntional Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). To better contrast the difference between
initial estimates and revised data, Chart 1 shows real-time estimates and the latest avail-
able revisions only, and, making the simplifying assumption that data revised three
years after the initial estimates are approximately correct, it displays revised data for the
period up to spring 2002.
3Athanasios Orphanides and John Williams (2005). “Inflation Scares and Fore-
cast-Based Monetary Policy,” CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 4844.
4Vitor Gaspar, Frank Smets, and David Vestin (2005). “Monetary Policy under
Adaptive Learning,” ECB, mimeo, available at http://econ.ucsc.edu/~walshc /Work-
shop_Program_links.pdf.
5BEIR also may have been affected by technical market factors. When assessing
developments in BEIR, caution is needed. Beyond short-term movements in finan-
cial prices that may distort the information content of long-term interest rates, an
upward movement in BEIR may signal an increase in inflation expectations or in
the risk premium associated to higher inflation uncertainty, although both are of
obvious concern for a central bank.  
6This decomposition of break-even inflation into short- and long-term expecta-
tions can be carried out for the euro area only from 2004, as the financial
instruments needed to compute it are not available for previous periods. However,
data on BEIR are available from 2001 and, linked to French CPI, from 1999—the
inception of the single monetary policy. There are also available survey-based data
on inflation expectations. Table 2 in the Appendix presents mean and standard
deviation of these different measures of inflation expectations and compares them
with corresponding measures of inflation expectations for the United States. Infla-
tion expectations have been, on average, lower and less volatile in the euro area than
in the United States.
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